‘Science and technology have become political’

Melanie Peters, director of the Rathenau Institute.
‘In this world knowledge is a political weapon.’ Photo: Rathenau Institute

China does not influence WUR’s research because that research takes place in the public domain and everything is published, claimed Wageningen researchers in Resource (5 November).That is naïve, says Melanie Peters, director of the Rathenau Institute.

Wageningen researchers send the DNA of plant varieties to China for DNA sequencing on a regular basis. The Beijing Genomics Institute (BGI), which has hundreds of DNA sequencers, does the research fast and cheaply. No problem, surely? Watch out, says Melanie Peters. BGI provides the DNA information, but keeps a copy of it too. China is working on a digital gene bank, a database in which the DNA of all animal and plant species is stored, including the variation in characteristics within those species. ‘The DNA of Dutch citizens, coming from our hospitals, is sent there for sequencing too. That DNA information is crucial. Do we have access to it? It’s noticeable that China doesn’t send blood samples to Europe or the United States. China is building a sort of Google for DNA information.’

Does that harm anyone? Don’t we have gene banks too?

‘There is nothing against it, as long as everyone shares their information. But the world has changed and there is a global competition going on for knowledge. Knowledge about gene technology and artificial intelligence is protected, big companies monopolize knowledge, and intelligence services hack knowledge. In this world, knowledge is a political weapon. That is why China wants to be autonomous and ahead of the field in gene technology, as does the European Union. Because it can also be used against you.’

How?

‘Take techniques like facial recognition, for example. You can use them for behavioural research, but also for surveillance of population groups. I  think you have to consider beforehand what the potential dangers of your technology could be and that you should set conditions for its use.’

Surely you don’t want to kill innovations like CRISPR-Cas? 

‘CRISPR-Cas was partly discovered in the Netherlands, the French turned it into a tool, and the Americans patented it. That is a rough summary, but the point is: this technology is not freely available, and the Americans now decide the conditions and costs of using it. That doesn’t align with WUR’s mission or with Dutch and European policy. For precisely that reason, a university should consider beforehand who it collaborates with and under what conditions.’

This is not just about China, is it?

‘This applies to all research partners. I think universities must continue to collaborate internationally, but you don’t want an American company or the Chinese government gaining an exclusive position in an area like human DNA data. Which is why the European Union, like China, is now setting up a large sequencing centre so that all that DNA information stays in Europe. And it is why the EU is also investing in artificial intelligence. It wants to be autonomous, precisely because there’s a technology war on.’

What are the signs of that technology war?

‘The development of the coronavirus vaccine is an example and a touchstone. It’s a race to see who gets a vaccine first and thereby gains market dominance. The pharmaceutical firm Phizer and biotechnology company BioNTech now seem to have an effective vaccine. That is an American-German collaboration. Now the pharmaceutical company Moderna is claiming that its vaccine is even more effective. The point is: will everyone in the world have access to this vaccine at an affordable price?’

What can a research institute do, practically?

‘First, opt for long-term research with public and private sector partners who you know to be willing to make the technology widely available. As a university, you can select your partners on that basis. And your research strategy can address the question: what impact do I want to have and with which partners do I want to work towards it?’

‘Secondly: protect your data properly. We used to do that: Dutch data on nuclear energy and weapons was well protected after it was found to have been leaked to Pakistan. Now you have to think about digital and genetic information and geo-data. You need to establish who gets access to that data. When researchers work with datasets belonging to the police or a supermarket chain, they work in that organization’s building, so the data stay there. That’s how organizations protect their data. Universities and institutes can protect their data in the same way. Find out where the sensitive data are, and create a kind of biosafety lab there that nothing is allowed to leak from. You have to establish access rules that apply to everyone.’

Lastly, what about another WUR topic – food?

‘There are strategic and political sides to food too – diseases and pests, for instance. You can use information about animal diseases to improve food supplies and you can misuse them for biological warfare. We’ve got to be aware of that in this cyber world.’

Response from WUR
We are aware of the sensitive nature of with countries like China. WUR does business with BGI Genomics, a listed company. WUR has commercial contracts with this company and on completion of the contracts, BGI destroys all samples and sequence data. The Chinese national gene bank CNGB falls under BGI too. The gene bank is a not-for-profit organization that our gene bank works with.
We make carefully considered decisions about who we work with and on what, following strict norms to guarantee the independence of research. In the internal memo ‘Guidelines for WUR business in China’ there are guidelines on integrity, IP, ethics and anti-corruption, and a clear decision-making procedure. We do not enter into collaboration if it would compromise WUR’s reliability.

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